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It is difficult to turn on one's television these days without receiving
a brief lesson on free speech, as the bounds of the First Amendment
are debated by some and tested by others. On a recent night in New
York City, for example, a television viewer could watch a debate on
free expression, starring the likes of Robert Bork, William F. Buckley,
and Cornel West.' On an adjacent channel, a public access station
broadcast a sadomasochistic videotape apparently made in a fetish
club near Times Square.2 In the latter broadcast, a woman lay nude
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1. The debate was broadcast as an episode of Fiing Line. Staged at the University of
Pennsylvania, the proposition debated was "Political Correctness Is a Menace and a Bore."
William F. Buckley, Robert Bork, Ira Glasser of the American Civil Liberties Union, and Cathar-
ine Stimpson, dean of the Rutgers graduate school, argued for the proposition. Opposing were
Mark Green, public advocate for New York City, Leon Botstein, Bard College president; Linda
Greene, University of Wisconsin law professor, and Cornel West, director of Afro-American
studies at Princeton University. For a partial text, see The Next-to-Last Word on Political Correctness,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1993, at A23.
2. The show, apparently a regular feature of NewYork public access television, was entitled
Club Fetish. The particular episode described in the text was broadcast on December 14, 1993.
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on a table, bound and gagged, as another woman pinched her with
clothes pins, dripped hot wax on her exposed breasts, and massaged
her genitalia with an open pen knife.
The juxtaposition between First Amendment theorizing and First
Amendment practice is not always so stark. But there is no doubt that
free speech issues have been among the most controversial constitu-
tional topics of the last few years. In particular, the debate about the
appropriate bounds of pornography and sexually explicit speech is
raging, not only on television but also in legal academia,- Congress,4
the federal bureaucracy, states and localities,6 and the courts.7 The
conflict, along with the somewhat related controversies over hate
speech and "political correctness," is reminiscent of the abortion
debate in its divisiveness and apparent lack of common ground.
Catherine MacKinnon's new book, Only Words, has been a lightning
rod. MacKinnon, of course, is no stranger to controversy, as she has
been at the forefront of the political and social debate on issues of
pornography, sexual harassment, prostitution, and the rights of
women for over a decade.8 Only Words is the most recent addition to
an impressive body of work. Her 1987 book Feminism Unmodified,9 a
collection of essays, may be one of the most read and most discussed
works in American law schools. The controversial model anti-
pornography ordinance she authored with Andrea Dworkin has been
considered by a number of localities, most notably Minneapolis, where
3. See, e.g., EDWARD DEGRAZIA, GIRLS LEAN BACK EVERYWHERE: THE LAW OF OBSCENrIYAND
THE ASSAULT ON GENIUS (1991); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH 209-27 (1993); Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate Speech and Pornography After RA. V., 60 U.
CHI. L. REv. 873 (1993); James Lindgren, Defining Pornography, 141 U. PENN. L. REv. 1153
(1993); Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of"The"Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REV.
1099 (1993); Marianne Wesson, Girls Should Bring Lawsuits Everywhere . . . Nothing Will Be
Corrupted: Pornography as Speech and Produc4 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 845 (1993).
4. See, e.g., Pornography Victims Compensation Act, S. 1521, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)
(proposing to permit victims of forcible sex crimes to sue producers, distributors, exhibitors, and
sellers of obscene materials and child pornography on showing that those materials contributed
to victimization).
5. See, e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT (1987)
(examining pornography's impact on society).
6. See, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (striking
down Indianapolis ordinance making pornography actionable as civil rights violation), afd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
7. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); Hudnu4 771 F.2d 323.
8. MacKinnon was recently identified as one of the 100 most influential lawyers in the
United States. See The 1994 Power List NAT'L LJ., Apr. 4, 1994, at C4, C9. For a profile of
MacKinnon, see Fred Strebeigh, Defining Law on the Feminist Frontier, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1991
(Magazine), at 29.
9. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987).
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it was passed by the City Council but vetoed by the Mayor,"° and
Indianapolis, where it was adopted only to be struck down by the
Seventh Circuit."
It is no surprise, therefore, that Only Words has become the focus
of much attention and debate. Its brevity and polemical tone make
it both a manifesto-like call to arms and a convenient target of
blistering counterattacks. 2 Whatever else might be said, MacKinnon
succeeds in a way in which few law professors ever do: she creates a
stir.
MacKinnon argues that pornography3 changes men1 4 and harms
women (p. 15). The harm to women is of three kinds. Women are
coerced (either overtly or through their position of inequality and
powerlessness) into making pornography (pp. 15, 20); women are
victimized by sexual crimes committed by men who are incited by
pornography to commit rape and other acts of violence (pp. 18-20);
and women are subordinated and devalued in a society infused with
pornographic images and expression (pp. 19, 25). According to
MacKinnon, such real harm should be cognizable within First
Amendment doctrine, making pornography regulable in any number
of ways.
The collection of historical essays contained in The Invention of
Pornography is a quieter addition to the debate. Its focus is purely
historical, and, at first glance, its relevance to the modern debate is
tangential at best. In examining the use and regulation of sexually
explicit expression in Western Europe from the fifteenth century to
the beginning of the nineteenth century, Invention is a scholarly and,
at times, dense contribution.
Invention does, however, offer a worthy source of analysis on
modern issues surrounding pornography. Although editor Lynn
Hunt 5 refuses to make explicit judgments on the current issues
10. See Howard Kurtz, New War on Pornography: Librarians Argue with Preachers Over City Law,
WASH. POST, July 29, 1984, at A4.
11. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 332.
12. See, e.g., Michiko Kakutani, Pornography, the Constitution and a Fight Thereof N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 29, 1993, at C26 (stating that Only Words is "very angry book");John Leo, Censors on the Left
U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., Oct. 4, 1993, at 30 (stating that Only Words is "one long scream about
sex and men"); Richard Posner, Book Review, NEW REPuBLIC, Oct. 18, 1993, at 31 (calling Only
Words "a verbal torrent that appeals, much like pornography itself.... to elemental passions.
rather than to the rational intellect").
13. MacKinnon defines "pornography" as "graphic sexually explicit materials that
subordinate women through pictures or words." MACKINNON, supra note 9, at 22.
14. See also MACKINNON, supra note 9, at 189-90 (stating that pornography hurts men's
capacity to relate to women).
15. Lynn Hunt is an Annenberg Professor of History at the University of Pennsylvania.
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surrounding pornography, she nevertheless asserts that understand-
ing the history of sexually explicit expression is "essential" to
understanding the current debates (p. 11). According to Hunt and
her co-contributors, the emergence of sexually explicit expression as
a separate category of understanding was linked to "the long-term
emergence of Western modernity" (pp. 10-11). Early modern
pornography revealed "some of the nascent characteristics of modern
culture" (p. 11). As in all honest history, the moral of the story is not
crystalline. But one comes away from reading Invention's essays with
the impression that, from a historical perspective, pornography is not
as unambiguously negative as MacKinnon asserts.
In a sense, both books explore something that existing First
Amendment doctrine does not fully address. Invention plausibly
stands for the notion that sexual expression was and is important in
aiding individuals to develop a sense of autonomy and freedom
necessary to modern society and, presumably, modern democracies.
Existing First Amendment law, however, devalues sexuality and
sexually explicit speech. One obvious example is how the legal
category of "obscenity" is limited to expression that appeals to the
prurient, i.e., sexual, interest of the audience.17 It is of course easy
to identify expressive material that is both highly "offensive" and
lacking in literary value, but which has nothing to do with sex. By
including within the legal test for "obscenity" the requirement that
the expression be sexual in nature, current First Amendment law
allows sexual expression to be subject to regulation in ways that
expression appealing to other emotions or urges, or to the intellect,
is not.
18
MacKinnon, too, points to an obtuseness in the First Amendment
tradition. To draw on the same example, obscenity law depends on
"offense," "community standards," and "serious value"-none of which
captures very well (if at all) a consideration of the harms MacKinnon
16. Hunt and her colleagues define "pornography" as sexually explicit expression aimed at
arousing sexual feelings, declining to incorporate the subordination aspect of MacKinnon's
definition. THE INVENTION OF PORNOGRAPHY: OBSCENIYAND THE ORIGINS OFMODERNITY, 1500-
1800, at 10 (Lynn Hunt ed., 1993).
17. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Under Miller, obscenity is beyond the
protection of the First Amendment. Obscenity is defined as expressive material that depicts or
describes sexual conduct and that (a) according to community standards appeals to the
.prurient interest"; (b) is "patently offensive" as defined by state law; and (c) taken as a whole,
lacks "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id.
18. Another example of the second-class constitutional status of sexual speech can be found
in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456. A plurality of the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the expressive nature of nude dancing, id. at 2460, but nevertheless upheld an Indiana
prohibition of such dancing in order to protect "societal order and morality." Id. at 2461. This
basis for decision would be unthinkable in a different First Amendment context.
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identifies.19 As MacKinnon suggests, the more pervasive the harm,
the less shocking or "offensive" it may become, and the less likely it
is that the obscenity test will identify it. If, for example, society is
permeated with an assumption that women are subordinate to men,
the average jury may not be offended by material expressing that
subordination.
Thus, both Invention and Words suggest that the lines defining
protected and unprotected sexually explicit speech are unacceptable.
Moreover, as we seek out a better definitional line, existing doc-
trine-with its talk of obscenity," content-based regulation,2 and
viewpoint neutrality 2-does not seem to lead us to the right ques-
tions. The existing theoretical framework fails to frame the inquiry
in a helpful way, and the debaters speak past each other.23
Existing doctrine does not allow the articulation of an intermediate
position that would recognize the ambiguities surrounding, and
conflicting judgments about, sexually explicit speech. On the one
hand, MacKinnon certainly seems correct in recognizing that some,
if not most, existing explicit sexual expression is denigrating to
women, that some men are negatively influenced by it in nontrivial
ways,24 that some women are coerced into aiding in its produc-
tion,' and that pervasive images of women in subordinate roles
influence our societal subconscious. 26 On the other hand, sexuality
has a convincing claim to being a part of any version of the Good
Life,2' and expression of one's sexuality and the opportunity to
experience the sexual expression of others may legitimately be seen
as an important part of sexuality in general.28
19. See MACKINNON, supra note 9, at 150 (contending that obscenity law is not consonant
with "feminist critique," which would regulate pornography to protect women).
20. Mill, 413 U.S. at 24.
21. RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992) (noting that content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid).
22. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328, 332 (7th Cir. 1985) (striking
down anti-pornography ordinance because it was not viewpoint neutral).
23. For an example of how prominent theorists can speak past one another, see The First
Amendment, Under Fire from the Left, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1994 (Magazine), at 42 (publishing
debate between Floyd Abrams and Catherine MacKinnon).
24. For a review of the evidence on this point, see STJNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 217-18.
25. See, e.g., LINDA LOvELACE & MICHAEL McGRADY, ORDEAL (1980) (describing Lovelace's
experience of being coerced into making pornographic film Deep Throat).
26. See SANDRA L. BARTKy, FEMININITY AND DOMINATION 25, 83-98 (1990) (arguing that
subordination of women is so pervasive that it appears to be natural and that women are more
likely than men to see themselves as inadequate or diminished); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note
3, at 219-20.
27. See Martha Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, in LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD 203,
220-21 (IL. Bruce Douglas et al. eds., 1990).
28. See SUNSTEN, supra note 3, at 215.
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To admit to believing both of these seemingly contradictory
propositions is not to acknowledge intellectual schizophrenia. Rather,
it is to recognize the immense complexity of the subject of sexuality
and the honest conflicts contained within the intuitions and reflective
judgments of many individuals grappling with these issues. Unfortu-
nately, when these tensions are most conspicuous-in the context of
a proposed pornography regulation, for example-existing First
Amendment doctrine does not seem to provide much help. For the
most part, existing theory disservesjudicial analysis and guides courts
away from considering both the benefits and harms that we as
individuals recognize and acknowledge.
Parts I and II of this Essay will outline how Words and Invention
analyze pornography and sexually explicit expression, suggesting some
of the ways in which existing law fails to recognize either the harms
or benefits of such expression. Part III attempts to sketch a new First
Amendment theory that posits as its core value the development of
human capacity. Such a theory would allow both the benefits and
harms of sexual expression to be recognized and balanced. While I
do not here propose definitive answers to the most difficult issues of
pornography regulation, I do propose, in Part IV, that a First
Amendment doctrine based on the importance of the development
of human capacity would challenge us to reflect about sexual
expression in a way that would result in principled and consistent First
Amendment answers.
I.
It seems that the voice often missing from the debate over
pornography and its regulation has been that which would support
sexual expression for the benefits it provides individuals and society.
As author Susie Bright recently asserted:
[E]ither you get the liberals whining that 'It's freedom of speech.
I guess we're gonna have to live with it,' or you get the Playboy
philosophy, which is, I don't know, running around in your slippers
with a bunny chasing you. And then you have the ani-porn
people.... But does that really describe human sexuality?'
Invention's historical perspective is helpful in this regard. Though
the essays in the volume routinely acknowledge the possible evils and
harms of pornography, they also show some of the reasons why the
case against pornography need not be as open and shut as
29. Dwight Garner, Susie Bright, Sex Queen, BOSTON PHOENIX, Dec. 17, 1993, at 6-7 (quoting
Susie Bright). Bright is the editor of The Best American Erotica 1993 (1993).
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MacKinnon would have it. According to Invention, throughout the
history of Western culture, pornography and sexually explicit speech
have provided benefits that are both political and personal. More-
over, Invention suggests that some of these benefits come hand in
hand with aspects of the speech often used to identify its offensive-
ness.
According to Invention, pornography slowly developed as a legal and
artistic category in the years between 1500 and 1800, but emerged as
a distinct category only in the early nineteenth century (pp. 9-10).
Before that time, pornography was not a distinct legal category in
Western culture (p. 10). Instead, it was considered a part of other
styles of political or social commentary and criticism. Hunt argues
that as late as 1806, the distinction between sexually explicit expres-
sion and other forms of heresy, philosophical radicalism, and political
subversion was not widely understood (p. 16). In France, porno-
graphic stories were regulated as "philosophical books," along with
any other book that threatened religion or the state, from satires of
the church to political pamphlets advocating such subversive ideas as
an independent judiciary (pp. 18-19).
According to Hunt, an analysis of pornography before the
nineteenth century cannot be separated from an analysis of "the long-
term emergence of Western modernity" (pp. 10-11). Early pornogra-
phy, she says, reveals "some of the emerging characteristics of modern
culture": free thinking, heresy, science and natural philosophy, and
attacks on political authority (p. 11).
Invention's essays seek to make this point through a detailed
exposition of various threads of the history of Western European
pornography. Beginning in sixteenth-century Renaissance Italy, as
described in the first essay by Paula Findlen, ° sexually explicit
expression revealed elements of the modern, including a dedication
to the senses and an irreverence for social hierarchy and convention.
In one of the earliest pornographic works of prose, Pietro Aretino's
Ragionamenti (1534-1536), women narrated tales of their erotic
experiences, and were seen as sexual beings discovering their own
passions (p. 74). The subversive anti-clerical aspect of the work is
made clear as one of the female characters recounts how she was
initiated into the pleasures of sex while a nun at a monastery (p. 74).
30. Paula Findlen, Humanism, Politics and Pornography in Renaissance Italy, in THE INVENTION
OF PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 16, at 49. Findlen teaches in the Department of History and the
Program in the History and Philosophy of Science at the University of California, Davis. Id. at
401.
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Aretino's most famous work, which became known as "Aretino's
Postures" (p. 25), contained detailed engravings of various positions
for lovemaking, accompanied by explicit sonnets praising the
experience of sex (pp. 65-74). Like Ragionamenti, the Postures
became one of the most enduring pornographic works in European
history. Findlen suggests that the Postures "reinforced the dangerous
powers of the senses" by describing the sensations of sex in explicit
detail (p. 74). Aretino apparently seems "modem" because of his
willingness to take an almost scientific perspective on both sexual
technique and the patterns of physical pleasure.
Aretino's contemporaries also used graphic sexual images to spice
up their political satire. One notable example depicts factional
struggles in Siena in terms of competition between the patrician
Pricks and Cunts, the aristocratic Balls, and the plebeian Asses (pp.
86-92). These Italian works marked a breakthrough by flaunting
sexual taboos to make political satire and social commentary. Findlen
asserts that such works were the precursor for the political pomogra-
phy that appeared with increasing frequency in Europe during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (pp. 107-08).
Aretino and his contemporaries also marked themselves as
"modem" by utilizing the new technology of printing to distribute
their works widely (p. 54). The reactions of various authorities to
pornographic works were motivated less by the offensiveness of the
ideas than by extreme discomfort that the general public had
increasing access to them (pp. 54-55). For Philip II to have Titian's
erotic paintings hidden behind a curtain for viewing only by visitors
of the monarch's choosing was one thing. It was quite another for
Aretino's Postures to be available to an increasingly literate public
(pp. 54-55).
Some learned elite pointed to the distribution of pornographic
works as the fulfillment of the "most dire prophesies" that a "market-
place of ideas" would lead to society's ruin (p. 55). Pope Paul IV
established the Index of Forbidden Books in 1559, banning "lascivious
or obscene" books along with heretical works and Protestant writings
(p. 55). But, according to Findlen, censorship elevated the status of
pornography by making it difficult to acquire (p. 57). The censorship
also may have facilitated the spread of the pornographic culture to
France and England, where the Inquisition held less sway (p. 58). By
the end of the sixteenth century, Aretino's works were being printed
in London and smuggled into Italy (p. 58).
The international trade in pornographic works that grew up over
time was quite profitable (p. 57). Printing allowed eroticism to be
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commodified, permitting printers, engravers, and importers to
exercise their modem sensibilities and make money in the process, as
long as they were willing to risk the occasional hazard of imprison-
ment (pp. 54-59). Findlen argues that pornography became "the
preferred medium through which to vent one's outrage about the ills
of society while, at the same time, making a tidy profit" (p. 108).
The next major moment in the development of a pornographic
tradition came in the late 1600s with the publication of the first major
French pornographic works, L'Ecole des filles, ou la philosophedes dames
and L'Acadhmie des dames. Both built on Aretino's tradition of female
narration, but they also tested new novelistic formulations (pp. 119-
23). Both were seen as politically subversive. The women in
L'Academie, for example, agreed that the "civil laws are contrary to
those of nature" (p. 172). By 1660, Hunt asserts, all the themes of
later prose pornography were present: "the self-conscious aim of
arousing sexual desire in the reader"; the stark comparison between
the material truth of sex and the hypocritical conventions of society
and the church; and a cataloguing of the different ways to gratify the
senses (p. 30).
Pornographic writing gained another burst of creative energy in the
1740s with the publication of a number of influential works, the most
famous being John Cleland's Fanny HilL31 According to Hunt, it is
not coincidental that this rise in pornographic writings marked the
beginning of the high period of the Enlightenment (p. 33). With a
greater understanding of nature came the belief that "repression of
sexual appetite was artificial and pointless" (p. 34).
Sexual enlightenment, according to essayist Margaret Jacob,32 was
an important component of the "vast philosophical transformation"
that occurred in European thought in the late seventeenth century (p.
157). The ability to "mechanize and atomize physical nature" brought
with it the philosophy of materialism (p. 158). Humans, like other
bodies in nature, were seen as subject to natural laws and impulses.
According to Jacob, the pornographic novel became the "vehicle for
explaining and inventing the sexual bodies" occupying a "privatized
space occupied only by bodies in motion" (p. 158). With a greater
31. JOHN CLELAND, FANNY HILL, OR, MEMOIRS OF A WOMAN OF PLEASURE (large print ed.
1991). Fanny Hill continued to be a subject of controversy more than two centuries after its
publication. In 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts ruling that the book
was obscene. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
Gen., 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966).
32. Margaret C.Jacob, The Materialist World of Pornography, in THE INVENTION OF PORNOGRA-
PHY, supra note 16, at 157. Jacob is Professor of History in the University of the New School for
Social Research. Id. at 401.
1206 THE AMERICAN UNIVERsrIY LAW REVIEW
materialist inspiration, happiness turned less on the hereafter than
the here and now. It became possible in Western culture to believe
that eroticism was an important part of happiness--"passions might
have a beneficial influence in making humans happy in this world"
(p. 34).
In fact, materialist pornography was part of the "new sociability" in
the cities and larger towns of Europe (p. 159). In contrast to the
traditional interactions characterized by dependence on family, guild,
court, and church, the new social universe was typified by men and
women meeting as individuals rather than members of some tradition-
al corpus (p. 159). Materialist eroticism both reflected and helped
construct this new world of autonomy and relative anonymity (p. 159).
To civil and religious authorities, however, pornography was no less
dangerous because it reflected society. By making the spiritual realm
irrelevant and offering ajustification for satisfying the pleasures of the
body, pornography and materialism stood as powerful affronts to
traditional hierarchy. Not surprisingly, the pornographer and
materialist philosopher were censored, arrested, and jailed (p. 162).
Materialism was subversive not only in philosophy and in politics,
but also in gender issues. Materialist pornography insisted that all
creatures in nature be equally controlled by nature and oriented to
the passion of the bodies; in such a world, women had to be sexual
equals of men (p. 38). Jacob asserts that within this materialist sexual
regime, the "atomized bodies .. . are totally privatized. In the
process, they become roughly, perhaps inadvertently, equalized; they
are as similar, as equal and metaphysically ungendered as the atoms
and planets" (p. 182). This nascent equality norm stood in stark and
subversive contrast to the "sexual difference that was increasingly
coming into vogue in medical tracts and domestic manuals" (pp. 38-
39). As Hunt explains, pornography, which "intentionally trans-
gressed the boundaries establishing difference," directly contradicted
the ideology of a private, separate sphere for women (p. 45).
According to Jacob, the abundance of female narrators was
emblematic of pornography's insistence on sexual equality. The
authors of the works, most of whom were probably male, may have
used female narrators because of an unconscious desire "to postulate
and advocate a commonplace, domesticated sexuality that could be
experienced by everyone, to encourage a private space where fantasy
is permitted, even if it is never quite fulfilled" (pp. 182-83).
To be sure, early pornography, like modern pornography, was
created primarily by men for men. ButJacob asserts that by establish-
ing a tradition and philosophic basis for female desire, the female
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narrator was a subversive and important development. Pornography,
in effect, created a sphere in which women could be sexually
autonomous and could try out sexual initiation and playfully test
sexual variation (pp. 170, 174-75). For their part, men had to "admit
female participation and even female activation" in sexual relations
(p. 165). By leaving "room for female desire" (p. 218), enlighten-
ment pornography contained kernels of sexual equality that present-
day pornography frequently does not.
Between 1740 and 1790, pornography became even more political
in form. In France, sexually explicit pamphlets attacked the clergy,
the court, and the King. In the 1790s, the French Revolution let
loose a "cascade" of pornographic pamphlets directly linked to
political conflicts, reaching a wider audience than ever before (pp. 35,
42, 317). Hunt 3 argues that political pornography helped bring
about the French Revolution by undermining the authority and
legitimacy of the ancien rigime (p. 301). Queen Marie Antoinette was
the focus of a number of obscene works-in one pamphlet she is
depicted in an orgy with the King's brother, a count, and a duchess
(p. 307). In another, she is depicted in a liaison with a young man
from the lower classes (p. 325). The availability of the Queen's body
implied that the Queen, indeed the government, was available to
every man (p. 325).
According to Hunt, a major turning point in the history of
pornography occurred between the 1790s and the 1830s (p. 41).
Until the end of the 1790s, explicit sexual expression almost always
had qualities that made it expressly politically subversive (p. 42).
Toward the end of the 1790s, however, it began to lose its political
connotations and instead became much more a commercial, "hard-
core" business (p. 42). Hunt hypothesizes that the success of political
pornography spelled its own defeat. With the downfall of the ancien
rigime, much of the political energy behind pornography died out.
Moreover, as the presses became freer and pornography became more
mass produced, it could make money based on its sexual appeal and
increasingly needed no other justification (pp. 331-32).
Meanwhile, the writings of the Marquis de Sade showed how
pornography could culminate in what Hunt calls the "ultimate
reductio ad absurdum of pornography"-portrayals of rape, incest,
parricide, sacrilege, pedophilia, as well as the pornographic depictions
of torture and murder (p. 35). With Sade's influence, pornography
33. Lynn Hunt, Pornography and the French Revolution, in THE INVENTION OF PORNOGRAPHY,
supra note 16, at 301.
1208 THE AMERICAN UNiVERSITY LAW REVIEW
came to be identified with a general assault on morality rather than
a critique of the injustices of the ancien rigime (p. 330). So, during
the years following the French Revolution, French pornography
became less political, more widely disseminated, more focused on
sexual arousal as its dominant motivator, and more graphically
disturbing (p. 305). Hunt points out the paradox: once political
pornography became democratized, it ceased to be political (p. 305).
The danger of pornography began to be seen as moral and social
rather than political, and the impetus to regulate pornography for
moral reasons gained influence as its role as political critique declined
(p. 43). Elsewhere in Europe, the "specter of the French Revolution,
with its threat of democratization ... galvanized the trends toward the
regulation of pornography as a distinct category" (p. 302).
The history of pornography as told by Invention's essays thus reveals
that the regulatory tensions faced by lawmakers today are hardly new.
Some explicit sexual expression may have had positive effects. The
sexual urge helped spur international trade, adjustments to gender
roles, and the overthrow of the ancien rigime 4 Yet early pomogra-
phy also devolved into Sade, presaging the worst of modern pornogra-
phy.
To a certain extent, the wish to regulate Sade's modern counter-
parts may have been a defining motivation behind this country's
development of the definition of "obscenity" for the purposes of
regulation." To be sure, though traditional First Amendment
doctrine cannot quite explain why,36 explicit sexual speech is viewed
differently than other expression. For other kinds of speech, the
benefits that Invention describes are assumed to accompany, and thus
have been used by courts to define, the types of so-called "high value"
expression that conventionally are beyond regulation but for the most
compelling reasons.3 7 But in fact, sexual speech, even sexual speech
34. And possibly technological change. See John Tiemey, Porn, the Low-Slung Engine of
Progress, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 9, 1994, at Hi.
35. See generally HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION 33-53 (1988) (describing
development of obscenity definition). In one of the first modem cases in which the Court
upheld a conviction for obscenity, the materials in question catered to a sadomasochistic
audience. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
36. See KALVEN, supra note 35, at 33-34 (noting that only justification for regulation of
obscenity that withstands scrutiny is "evil of exciting the sexual fantasies" and that this
justification "may be faint").
37. See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. C. 1505, 1508, 1517 (1993) (discussing
commercial speech in terms of "high" and "low" First Amendment value, where high-value
speech requires compelling reasons for regulation and low-value speech does not); R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542-43 (1992) (reiterating fact that "value" of speech determines
scope of First Amendment protection).
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that does not meet the precise definition of "obscenity," is often
relegated to second-class status.3 8
Whether courts can define and defend a principled distinction
between harmful sexual expression and valuable sexual expression is
an important challenge.3 9 Invention indicates, however, that the
factors currently used to define that distinction' are faulty, in that
some of the criteria that courts now use to label speech "low value"
are in fact associated, at times, with positive effects of the speech. If
Invention is correct, sexual expression's potential to create positive
social and personal effects may come in part from its ability to shock
and disturb. The fact that the expression is "offensive" or contrary to
community values-part of the Miller v. California definition of
"obscenity"41-may thus be related in some cases to positive, rather
than harmful, effects. If Invention says anything, therefore, it is that
traditional First Amendment doctrine guides us poorly in drawing a
line around the Sade among us.
II.
Only Words also questions existing First Amendment doctrine as it
relates to sexually explicit speech. Representing MacKinnon's most
thorough discussion to date of the First Amendment implications of
her fight against pornography, Words uses two analytical strategies to
argue that restrictions on pornography do not, or should not, offend
the First Amendment. Much of what she says rings true, and she
certainly is adept at showing how existing First Amendment doctrine
contains theoretical inconsistencies. Unfortunately, however, her
arguments do not reveal a dedication to any particular theoretical
conception of the First Amendment. Professor MacKinnon will be
satisfied, Words seems to imply, if either of her analytical strategies
carries the day. But without an underlying theory to explain
coherently the regulatory lines she wishes to draw, the result she
desires may contain as many inconsistencies as present doctrine.
Her first strategy fits nicely within existing First Amendment debate,
as she argues that pornography is "low value" speech that causes real
38. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. American Mini
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); see also GEOFFREY R. STONE zr AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1146-69
(1986).
39. See infra parts III & IV (proposing considerations to be used in drawing line between
harmful and valuable sexual expression).
40. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (outlining factors of obscenity
definition).
41. Id.
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and serious harms. Pornography has little value in traditional First
Amendment terms because it is not reflective-the "message is
addressed directly to the penis" (p. 21). Pornography is not speech
but rather sex itself: an act rather than speech. "[I]f First Amend-
ment protected thought is what men are doing while masturbating to
pornography . . . every mental blip short of a flat EEG is First
Amendment protected speech" (pp. 61-62).
Nor is pornography, according to MacKinnon, subject to the usual
counteracting forces of reason and counterspeech. Pornography does
not act on the conscious mind of a man. Rather, it operates on the
physical level and disables thought. "Try arguing with an orgasm
sometime," MacKinnon suggests, "[y] ou will find you are no match for
the sexual access and power the materials provide" (p. 17).
MacKinnon overstates her point, however, as she notes later in the
book that pornography's physical power is largely contextual and that
counterspeech is in fact possible. "Many believe that in settings that
encourage critical distance, [the] showing [of pornography] does not
damage women as much as it sensitizes viewers to the damage it does
to women" (p. 108).
The harm part of the equation-coercion in the production of
pornography, violence against women caused by men who read or
watch it, and the spread of the lies of inequality and subordina-
tion-are almost self-evident to MacKinnon. In effect, she defines
pornography in terms of its harm: it is that sexually explicit expres-
sion that subordinates women (p. 22). MacKinnon is quite specific
with this definition,42 but she is not so rigorous in explaining how to
apply it. She clearly believes that the insipid and relatively tame
photos appearing in Playboy fit within her definition because these
42. The so-called Model Ordinance, authored by MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin,
proposes the following definition of "pornography":
[T] he graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures and/or words
that also includes one or more of the following: (a) women are presented dehuman-
ized as sexual objects, things, or commodities; or (b) women are presented as sexual
objects who enjoy humiliation or pain; or (c) women are presented as sexual objects
experiencing sexual pleasure in rape, incest, or other sexual assault; or (d) women are
presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt;
or (e) women are presented in postures or positions of sexual submission, servility, or
display, or (f) women's body parts-including but not limited to vaginas, breasts, or
buttocks-are exhibited such that women are reduced to those parts; or (g) women
are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or (h) women are presented in
scenarios of degradation, humiliation, injury, torture, shown as filthy or inferior,
bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual.
Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male ood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S
LJ. 1, 25-26 (1985). MacKinnon adds that under this definition, the use of "men, children, or
transsexuals in the place of women" is also pornography. CATHERINE MACKINNON, ONLYWORDS
121-22 n.32 (1993).
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women "are objectified and presented dehumanized as sexual objects
or things for use" (pp. 22-23). She does not make clear, however, why
sexual desire necessarily equals sexual objectification. If "pornogra-
phy" included any representation of a woman as a subject of sexual
desire, Professor MacKinnon's broad definition would be coterminous
with all heterosexual and lesbian-oriented sexually explicit materi-
als,43 including many works of art, films, books, and dramatic
productions, not to mention much of what appears on cable television
as well as advertising aimed at both women and men.'
The breadth of MacKinnon's definition, however, is not the
problem. The difficulty is that once all these materials are lumped
together, MacKinnon describes "pornography" as having incredible
power to cause terrible harms, refusing to acknowledge that distinc-
tions might exist (both on the harm and benefit sides of the
equation) among the vast array of expression included in her
definition. MacKinnon suggests that "pornography makes rapists
unaware that their victims are not consenting" (p. 96); her point loses
force because she does not distinguish between "snuff' films (pp. 23,
35) and Victoria's Secret catalogues. Films eroticizing rape are one
thing. The statue of Venus, even if it portrays the female form as
subject to sexual desire,45 is another.
Both the power and the incompleteness of MacKinnon's argument
are evident from an analysis of her first identified harm. As described
by MacKinnon, the women involved in making pornography are
coerced into joining in its production (pp. 3-7, 20-21). She points to
the case of Linda Marchiano, once known as "Linda Lovelace," whose
biography tells the ghastly story of being coerced into making the
pornographic film Deep Throat 6 (p. 21). Everyone who watches that
film is said to be watching Marchiano's rape.47 There can be little
doubt that Marchiano's ordeal is not unique. Indeed, especially if
43. This definition could possibly extend to homoerotic works if the images of men can be
interpreted as portraying the subordination of women. See Strossen, supra note 3, at 1118-19
(noting that MacKinnon and Dworkin's definition could extend to homoerotic works); supra
note 42 (setting forth MacKinnon's model pornography ordinance).
44. Her definition might also capture many works seen as valuable to feminists. See
Strossen, supra note 3, at 1141-42. Strossen asserts that after the Canadian Supreme Court
adopted the MacKinnon/Dworkin analysis of "pornography," Canadian customs officials
confiscated two books written by Dworkin. Id. at 1142 n.171. MacKinnon, however, has
suggested that Canadian customs officials have not reviewed their standards since the Canadian
Supreme Court ruling. See The First Amendment, Under Fre fm the Left, supra note 23, at 57.
45. See Findlen, supra note 30, at 64-65. In the 1550s, the Italian Ludovico Dolce described
the effect of gazing on a statue of Venus: the "marble statue could by the stimuli of its beauty
so penetrate to the marrow of a young man, that he stained himself .... " Id. at 65.
46. LOVELACE & MCGRADY, supra note 25; see also MACKINNON, supra note 9, at 10-15.
47. MAcKINNON, supra note 9, at 182.
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one takes into account the international pornography and prostitu-
tion markets, MacKinnon's assertion of the pervasiveness of overt
coercion in the sex trade may be unassailable.48
Moreover, few would oppose her argument that those who assault,
rape, or murder women should be subject to tough criminal
prosecution and substantial civil claims, and that they should not
enjoy First Amendment protection when they are so warped as to film
their crime (p. 120 n.29). No one in his or her constitutionally right
mind would say that a Peeping Tom can transform his physical and
emotional trespass into protected First Amendment activity simply by
wearing a camera around his neck. Rape would be no different. 9
More provocative, and problematic, is MacKinnon's implicit claim
that none of the women who participate in the making of pornography
has truly consented to her participation (pp. 20-21). She is correct to
focus on the contortive range of options open to many women who
make their livings in the sex markets (pp. 20-21). By anyone's
standard, this limitation of options cannot be a good thing-certainly
we need to recognize, and do something about, the fact that so many
women find themselves in desperate financial, educational, and
domestic situations." Also uncontroversial, it seems, is MacKinnon's
unstated assumption that people's preferences and choices adjust to
their situations, no matter how unfortunate.-'
48. See Marlise Simons, The Littlest Prostitutes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1994 (Magazine), at 31.
49. Cf Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 509 (1991)
(striking down NewYork law restricting profits that could be made on books that were products
of criminal activity). As MacKinnon correctly points out (pp. 120 n.29, 145-46 n.63), Simon &
Schuster does not preclude civil claims for victims of rape or assault when those acts are filmed:
Simon & Schuster did not concern crimes that were committed so that they could be written
about, nor did it bar recovery for damages for mental anguish, injury to reputation, or invasion
of privacy. Moreover, the Court specifically held that the state's interest in compensating victims
was compelling, though the statute in question was not narrowly tailored to advance that
objective. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 512.
In addition, the Court's decision in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), suggests that
the government may punish the distribution of materials made through violence, in addition
to the underlying conduct. In Ferber, the Court upheld a statute prohibiting the distribution of
child pornography, primarily on the ground that the government had an interest in preventing
the underlying conduct, i.e., the sexual exploitation of children. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759; see also
Kagan, supra note 3, at 891. The case to be distinguished on this point is New York Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (allowing publication of so-called Pentagon Papers despite
fact that papers had been stolen from Pentagon).
50. See Martha Nussbaum, Aristotle, Feminism, and Needs forFunctioning, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1019,
1028 (1992) (arguing that feminism should be concerned with issues of "poverty, oppression,
inequality, and the frustration of capability in the lives of human beings the world over").
51. See Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen, Introduction to THE QUALIT' OF LIFE 5 (Martha
Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993) ("For in most parts of the world women do not have the
same opportunities as men. These inequalities-and the deficiencies in education and
experience often associated with them-tend to affect women's expectations and desires, since
it is difficult to desire what one cannot imagine as a possibility."); see also MARTHA NUSSBAUM,
LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE 62 (1990) (stating that people "adjust their preferences to what their actual
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The tough question is what this all means for First Amendment
theory. Some women, certainly, enjoy pornography or choose to
participate in its production.52 Yet, MacKinnon believes that because
"all pornography is made" and, she must add, experienced, "under
conditions of inequality based on sex" (p. 20), the choices of women
who participate in its production and the preferences of women who
enjoy reading or watching it are to count for nothing. 3 This may
be correct in some cases, but it demands more of an argument than
MacKinnon provides.
Indeed, the notion that women should be restricted from making
choices that might cause harm to themselves and others appears
inconsistent with feminist concerns. Consider the Johnson Controls
case,54 where some feminists fought to protect the right of women
to hold jobs that involved exposure to levels of lead dangerous to the
workers themselves and, if they were pregnant, their fetuses.55 These
feminists argued that the workers themselves should be offered the
choice because many of them were in dire economic straits and
desperately needed the higher wages the more dangerous jobs
offered.56 In effect, the limited alternatives available to women were
situation makes possible"); Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 213 (suggesting that habits and lifestyles
develop in conjunction with desires); cf. WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES 170 (1991)
(noting that state of human good cannot depend merely on internal states of feeling); CASS R.
SUNSTEIrN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 162-64,185-91 (1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION] (discussing phenomenon of individuals' preferences adjusting to unjust
background conditions); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 64-67 (1990)
(discussing endogenous preferences).
52. See Strossen, supra note 3, at 1138-40 (discussing women who choose to participate in
production of pornography); id. at 1133-34 (asserting that some women find even violent
pornography "liberating" because it allows for fantasies that involve breaking sexual taboos
without responsibility).
53. See MACKINNON, supra note 9, at 7-8 ("Because the inequality of the sexes is socially
defined as the enjoyment of sexuality itself, gender inequality appears consensual ...
[H]eterosexuality . . . organizes women's pleasure so as to give us a stake in our own
subordination.").
54. Automobile Workers v.Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
55. The Supreme Court agreed, saying that even when work may harm the fetus, "the
decision ... to work while being either pregnant or capable of becoming pregnant [is] reserved
for each individual woman to make for herself." Id. at 206; see also id. at 211.
56. See Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REv.
1219, 1225, 1241 (1986) (noting that fetal vulnerability policies, like historical statutes
.protecting" women from certain kinds of work or long work hours, are based in part on belief
that women are not competent decisionmakers). This issue of the competency of women to
make decisions was indeed a factor in the Johnson Controls case. The Seventh Circuit, whose
decision the Supreme Court overturned, had noted that the mandatory policy of excluding
women from hazardousjobs was necessary because a voluntary program had been unsuccessful.
UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 876-78 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), rv'd, 499 U.S.
187 (1991). Judge Cudahy's dissent pointed out that the woman at risk was the best
decisionmaker, given the poor choices available: "What is the situation of the pregnant woman,
unemployed or working for the minimum wage and unprotected by health insurance, in relation
to her pregnant sister, exposed to an indeterminate lead risk but well-fed, housed and doctored?
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offered to the Court as an added reason to respect, rather than
override, the women's right to choose. After Johnson Controls, to decry
the fact that women have only a limited range of choices does not
mean that a woman should be prevented from choosing the least bad
alternative of the available options.
Principled distinctions could be drawn betweenJohnson Controls and
the pornography settings, but MacKinnon neither identifies nor
addresses them. This goes to a weakness of the book: it is permeated
with notions of adaptive preferences and warped consent, but these
notions are left vague and undefined. MacKinnon offers no organiz-
ing theory to explain when and when not to respect a woman's
choices. To implement her First Amendment recommendations in a
principled way without such a theory would be quite difficult.
MacKinnon's second strategy for regulating pornography pushes the
boundaries of existing First Amendment doctrine, arguing that the
Constitution's equality norms should be balanced against its free
speech norms. MacKinnon analogizes pornography to speech made
actionable as sexual harassment or racial discrimination (pp. 45-68),
speech which, she says, has only recently been considered to have
First Amendment implications (p. 45). Discrimination law, she points
out, considers racist or sexist expression to be evidence of the mental
intent necessary to make discrimination a civil rights violation.
"[B] ecause of their mental location and content, these words are not
only potentially discriminatory in themselves; they are part of the
proof that other acts are discriminatory." (p. 51). Indeed, "[u]nder
discrimination law, such expression is not political opinion; it is a
smoking gun" (p. 50).
MacKinnon argues that the oft-asserted reasons why pornography
is protected speech-the autonomy of the speaker, the mental
intermediation, the nonneutrality of its regulation-do not explain
why pornography is protected and words that constitute sexual and
racial discrimination are not (p. 54). Her best explanation for the
apparent inconsistency is that equality is "crucially guaranteed" in the
workplace and not elsewhere (p. 54). MacKinnon would extend the
influence of the equality norm to speech issues in society at large
because the harm of sexist and racist speech does not stop at the
office door or factory gate. "Racial and sexual harassment," she says,
"promote inequality, violate oppressed groups, work to destroy their
social standing and repute, and target them for discrimination from
contempt to genocide." (p. 56).
Whose decision is this to make?" Id. at 902 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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The argument that speech issues should be interpreted in the light
of equal protection guarantees is a provocative and valuable develop-
ment in the debate about free speech doctrine." Yet this
contention's persuasiveness is hampered in MacKinnon's account by
her apparent disregard for the free speech norms to be balanced
against the equality norms. In MacKinnon's view, the equality norms
seem not to balance but to dominate: "the current legal distinction
between screaming 'go kill that nigger' and advocating the view that
African-Americans should be eliminated from parts of the United
States needs to be seriously reconsidered .. .." (p. 108).
With such simple strokes, MacKinnon does away with major First
Amendment concepts, among them the important distinction between
incitement and advocacy, and the key difference between criminal
threats and offensive ideas subject to counterspeech.58 Having done
so, she does not tell the reader with what to replace these concepts.
She refuses to explain why she believes the First Amendment is
important-if she does so believe-or which First Amendment theory
she would adopt.
MacKinnon's genius is to show the disturbing inconsistencies within
existing doctrine. She seems correct in pointing out that many of the
ostensible reasons for protecting pornography are not applied to
other settings. Unfortunately, without an organizing theory of her
own, the doctrinal dissonance she highlights could be resolved against
her just as easily as in her favor. The fact that there are inconsisten-
cies means only that present doctrine needs adjustment or replace-
ment. If, as MacKinnon cynically predicts, "speech will be defined so
that men can have their pornography," (p. 90) what makes her think
that the doctrine will be adjusted or replaced in the way she suggests?
57. MacKinnon is not alone in developing this argument. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, The Case
of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 151-61 (1992)
(applying equal protection arguments to hate-speech debate); Richard Delgado, Words That
Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 133,
134 (1982) (advocating civil tort remedy for racial insults as means of protecting citizens' rights
to equality); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Stoy. 87
MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2321 (1989) (recommending legal sanctions to remedy racist speech).
58. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376-77 (1927) (Brandeis,J., concurring). In his
famous discussion of the role of counterspeech, Justice Brandeis noted:
But even advocacy of violation [of the law], however reprehensible morally, is not a
justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and
there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on. The
wide difference between advocacy and incitement, between preparation and attempt,
between assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind.... If there be time to
expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the process
of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.
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Witness Justice Scalia's recent opinion in R.A.V v. City of St. PauL59
In R.A.V, the Court considered an ordinance that punished the
narrow category of so-called "fighting words" that also constituted
racist or sexist hate speech.6' Historically, the fighting-words model
has been a narrow one, including direct threats that would provoke
a reasonable "man" to start a fight.61 Traditionally, the Court had
held that fighting words were "of such slight social value" that the
"prevention and punishment" of them were "never... thought to
raise any Constitutional problem."
6 2
In R.A. V, the Court faced some of the apparent inconsistencies that
MacKinnon highlights. On one side stood the traditional rhetoric of
heightened scrutiny when statutes regulate speech on the basis of
content. The St. Paul ordinance was certainly content based, because
the subset of fighting words regulated was selected on the basis of its
racist or sexist substance. But as MacKinnon rightly points out, on
the other side of the balance, begging reconciliation, were
antidiscrimination statutes like title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,63 which make similar words actionable on the basis of their
content.' R.A.V, then, was a battle of competing analogies. Would
the Court uphold the ordinance on the basis of a comparison with
title VII or strike it down on the basis of a comparison with
impermissibly content-based statutes, such as the anti-flag-burning
statute struck down in Texas v. Johnson?65
Given MacKinnon's cynicism, the fact that RA.V resolved the
apparent tensions by striking down the ordinance, thereby narrowing
the protections for women and minorities, 66 must not have surprisedher. The Court held that the ordinance was not only content-based,
59. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
60. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. C. 2538, 2541 (1992).
61. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-73 (1942).
62. Id. at 571-72.
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-1
7 (1988) (providing for equal employmentopportunity).
64. Id. § 2000e-2 (outlawing employment-related discrimination "because of... race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin").
65. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
66. In fact, Scalia's majority opinion hinted that the Court considered most of the words
to be regulable under title VII as "fighting words" themselves. R.A.Y, 112 S. Ct. at 2546
("Sexually derogatory 'fighting words,' among otherwords, may produce a violation ofTitle VII's
general prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment practices."). If it were
followed, such a suggestion would eviscerate title VII because most of the words regulable under
title VII do not easily fall within the fighting words category. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (holding that "stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that
gender played a part" in employment decision). Comments at issue in Price Waterhouse included
a partner's comment that the plaintiff should "'walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled and wear jewelry.'" Id. at 272
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Nothing in title VII's elaborate procedural mechanism, however,
required the plaintiff to prove that she felt like hitting her bosses.
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but viewpoint-based as well.67 In the face of these doctrinal touch-
stones, the analogy with title VII was distinguished away.'
MacKinnon presumably would dismiss the worries about content
and viewpoint neutrality (p. 138 n.11). Certainly, the harm done by
burning a cross in the yard of an African-American family is linked
directly with the content of that expression, and MacKinnon is
certainly correct that the concepts of content and viewpoint neutrality
are often applied inconsistently.69 It is hardly inconceivable that
RA.V might have come out the other way. But MacKinnon must
admit that the concepts of content and viewpoint neutrality are
embedded in First Amendment doctrine and that they embody a
healthy skepticism for government meddling in public debate."0
They will not likely be jettisoned without powerful reasons, and they
will not likely be disregarded in specific cases without a coherent
theory to explain the exceptions. In other words, until MacKinnon
is prepared to advance a First Amendment doctrine that resolves the
tensions and inconsistencies in existing practice rather than simply
dismissing them, she runs the risk that R.A.V will be only the first of
many debilitating opinions.
71
67. R.A.Y, 112 S. Ct. at 2547 ("In its practical operation, moreover, the ordinance goes
even beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination.").
68. See id. at 2545-47 (explaining that title VII survives constitutional scrutiny because it
regulates entire category of speech for viewpoint-neutral reasons, but that St. Paul ordinance
fails because it regulates only certain types of speech based on viewpoint expressed); id. at 2557-
58 (white, J., concurring) (arguing that majority's asserted rationale to distinguish St. Paul
ordinance from title VII "does not hold up under close examination").
69. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 3, at 876 n.13 (citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v.
Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 330-32 (1986), and Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 569-71 (1980), as instances when Court upheld statutes limiting speech
notwithstanding viewpoint preferences embedded in statute). Consider also the laws against
obscenity, which allow restriction of speech that expresses a particular (offensive) opinion about
sexual matters. Id.; see MACKINNON, supra note 9, at 212.
70. When the government regulates content, there is arguably a greater risk that the
restriction in fact stems from an illegitimate motive. See SuNsatN, supra note 3, at 169-70.
71. This trend may have already begun in the Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., United States v.
Lee, 6 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 128 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1994). There, the
Eighth Circuit read RAVto require the use of the strict Brandenburg v. Ohio standard of review
in a cross burning case involving 18 U.S.C. § 241, a civil rights statute criminalizing conspiracies
to prevent citizens from exercising their legal rights. See Lee, 6 F.3d at 1300-02 (citing
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)). Even though the criminalization of conspiracies
has long been insulated from First Amendment scrutiny, the court depended on the strict
Brandenburg test because the government's interest in applying the statute was related to the
content of the expression. By the Eighth Circuit's standards, therefore, it appears that civil
rights laws can only be applied to punish racist or sexist speech that "is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action, and is likely to produce such action." Id. at 1302 (quoting
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447). This, of course, is a much stricter standard than is usually applied
to civil rights statutes. Cf. United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying lesser
standard of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) to similar civil rights statute), cet.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1369 (1994).
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III.
Invention of Pornography and Only Words embody many of our
conflicting judgments about sexually explicit expression. Both books
suggest, moreover, that conventional First Amendment analysis does
not help us reason well in resolving these tensions. What is needed
is a novel perspective on the First Amendment that might better
guide our thinking about pornography and other tough free
expression issues. This new view of the Free Speech Clause would
hold as its core value the importance of the development of individu-
al human capacity and of individual self-definition.
I provisionally call this view an "aristotelian" First Amendment.72
To date, this view of the First Amendment is largely undeveloped and
finds no defense in legal literature. This Part will explain how an
aristotelian First Amendment might work and suggest some of the
conflicts within it. In Part IV, I propose how such a view of the First
Amendment might aid in the analysis of free speech issues like
pornography.
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment--"Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech"-is tantalizingly
simple. It is easy, therefore, to state the interpretive focus of First
Amendment theory: to seek out the proper definition of the key
phrase "the freedom of speech." In absolutist analyses, "freedom" is
defined broadly, as synonymous with individual free will or autono-
mous discretion,"3 making the clause appear to provide complete or
72. The decision to call this view of the First Amendment "Aristotelian" is based more on
the writings of Martha Nussbaum, who has written much on Aristotle, see infra note 78, than on
Aristotle himself. Much work needs to be done to ground this view in Aristotle's writings and
in the broader Aristotelian scholarship. In some respects, calling this theory of the First
Amendment "Aristotelian" may be a disservice to both the theory and to Aristotelianism because
the theory need not be burdened with the flaws of Aristotelianism that do not bear on the First
Amendment debate, and vice versa. To be sure, the view that the First Amendment should be
seen as containing within it a dedication to a particular concept of the human "good" might not
be inconsistent with some liberal accounts. Cf. GALtsTON, supra note 51, at 170-71 (arguing that
liberalism presupposes account of human good, and that such account should include theory
of conditions, capacities, or functionings). To the extent that the view of the First Amendment
presented here may be inconsistent with Aristotelianism, the reader may instead call it "Theory
X" and evaluate it on its own terms. Because of the provisional and tentative nature of this
label, I refer to it as aristotelian-that is, derived from, but not intimately related to formal
Aristotelianism-for the remainder of the essay.
73. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRrTICAL ANALYSis 11-12
(arguing that free speech serves "only one true value... individual self-realization" and that
recognition of individual free will is inherent in First Amendment); Charles Fried, The New First
AmendmentJuriprudence: Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 225, 233 (1992) (suggesting that
free speech doctrine is founded on personal autonomy).
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nearly complete protection for "speech."74 In effect, such a broad
definition for the word "freedom" transforms the First Amendment
into a guarantee of the "liberty to speak."
The First Amendment absolutist assumption that "freedom" refers
to the individual free will of the speaker captures what is certainly a
central value underlying modem Free Speech doctrine.75 Absolutism
has much to say in its favor, and a number of variations on the basic
theme are beyond the scope of this essay.7 ' Generally, however, one
could suggest that the absolutist position is flawed in at least one
crucial respect: it defers completely to the unchallenged preferences,
or what one might call the "simple autonomy," of speakers, and does
not acknowledge that preferences can be, for example, based on
addictions, derived from unjust background conditions, or founded
on grossly unconsidered judgments."
The aristotelian First Amendment would be less deferential to
unchallenged, individual preferences, basing its view of "freedom" on
a version of autonomy informed by notions of human capacity.78 In
74. The distinction between speech and conduct then becomes the principal doctrinal
question. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment 72 YALE
LJ. 877, 880-81 (1963) (assuming that "freedom of expression" means that, as general
proposition, society may not control individual expression, but that there is "fundamental
distinction" between expression and conduct); id. at 917 (noting that "whole theory" of freedom
of expression depends on this distinction); id. at 932 (suggesting that problems with absolutist
applications can be solved in most cases by defining offending speech as conduct); see also
REDISH, supra note 73, at 18 (discussing speech/conduct dichotomy).
75. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 137 (recognizing popular viewpoint that First Amendment
primarily, if not exclusively, protects individual autonomy).
76. For a brief overview of this debate, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 137-39.
77. See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 73, at 12 (arguing that any "external determination" that
certain kinds of expression serve First Amendment values more than others is itself"a violation
of the individual's free will"). Cf NUSSBAuM, supra note 51, at 62. Nussbaum writes:
Aristotle does not think that the bare fact that someone prefers something gives us any
reason at all for ranking it as preferable. It all depends who the someone is and
through what procedures the ranking has been effected. The rankings of the person
of practical wisdom will be critical of our norms, both personal and social; what the
mad or childish person prefers counts little or nothing. Nor are the judgments of
severely deprived people to be trusted: for frequently they will adjust their preferences
to what their actual situation makes possible. Value is anthropocentric, not fixed
altogether independently of the desires and needs of human beings; but to say this is
very far from saying that every preference of every human being counts for evaluative
purposes.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also GALSTON, supra note 51, at 170-71 (arguing that liberal notion
of human good does not look only to preference satisfaction).
78. Martha Nussbaum's work is central here. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Non-Relative
Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE, supra note 51, at 242, 246 (examining
Aristotle's list of human "virtues," including courage, moderation, justice, and generosity, and
its relation to "human capacity"); Nussbaum, supra note 50, at 1022-24 (stating Aristotelian belief
that each person's human worth is defined by his or her "own reflection or choice"); Nussbaum,
supra note 27, at 220-26 (discussing capacities of human mind and body and their relationship
to Aristotelian theory); see also GALSTON, supra note 51, at 170 ("An account of the human good
must be a theory of conditions, capacities, or functionings, notjust internal states of feeling.").
1220 THE AMERICAN UNIVERsrIY LAW REVIEW
other words, an aristotelian description of autonomy would be more
full-bodied than that of an absolutist, positing that a person cannot
be truly autonomous unless she has developed a "separateness" 9 that
includes an individual capacity for choice, thought, reflection, and
emotion. The process of developing this capacity is, in a sense, the
process of self-definition; it is the act of becoming unique. Without
this unique separateness, this autonomy, true freedom is impossible.
The word "freedom" in the First Amendment could therefore be
read to refer to this rich, capable, "Aristotelian" autonomy. The First
Amendment, then, would be read to protect the freedom that comes
from speech rather than, or in addition to, the liberty to speak. The
constitutional dialogue surrounding an aristotelian First Amendment
would focus on the development of a system of expression that
respects, builds, and protects this freedom under the Constitution.'
More particularly, an aristotelian First Amendment would hold that
self-definition is tied inextricably to experiencing the expression of
others while developing one's own methods of expression. Expression
would be seen as essential to self-actualization; without it, citizens
would lack the opportunity and capacity to live a full, robust, and
unique life."' The First Amendment would guarantee one of the
necessary conditions for citizens to develop their capacity to live
well-to live, in the words of Henry James, as people "finely aware
and richly responsible." 2
Undoubtedly, most speech and expression, including sexually
explicit expression, can be seen as encouraging and cultivating this
freedom. Generally, then, the aristotelian First Amendment would be
79. Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 223-25.
80. This is, in effect, what the political speech theorists seek to do-to shift the debate from
a consideration of what constitutes "speech" to an examination of what kinds of speech further
the "freedom" guaranteed by the First Amendment. Methodologically, then, up to such a point,
a political speech theorist and an Aristotelian would be in agreement. They would differ, of
course, in holding different views of"freedom." A political speech theorist would seek to protect
that expression helpful to a functioning democracy, see, e.g., Owen Fiss, Free Speech and Social
Structure, 71 IowA L. REv. 1405, 1407 (1986), while an Aristotelian would seek to protect that
expression conducive to individual development and capacity-building. See supra note 78.
81. This theory would accept the classical distinction between thought and action in that
it would protect discussion and thought pursuant to some actions even if the actions themselves
were not free from regulation. A book graphically describing the life of a prostitute, for
example, might be protected by an aristotelian First Amendment even if prostitution itself were
not. The acceptance of this thought/deed distinction is of course important in all theories of
free speech. See supra note 74. The distinction is rooted in the text of the First Amendment
itself, which protects the freedom that comes from "speech," leaving conduct to be protected
under the Fifth Amendment's protection against deprivations of"liberty." See REDISH, supra note
73, at 17-18; Emerson, supra note 74, at 880-81; see also Strossen, supra note 3, at 1129 (asserting
that MacKinnon and others dismiss thought/deed distinction).
82. HenryJames, The Princess Casamassima (New York, 1907-09) 1.169, quoted in NussBAUM,
supra note 51, at 84.
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quite protective of expression. In some limited contexts, however,
some narrow types of speech are plausibly considered as constrictive
of this freedom. The aristotelian First Amendment would therefore
hold at its core speech that cultivates this freedom, and allow
expression that does not cultivate this freedom to be regulated at a
lower level of justification.
Although an aristotelian First Amendment may yet require
development, threads of a capacity-based notion of freedom can be
found in some of the most influential First Amendment writings.
Justice Brandeis' famous concurrence in Whitney v. Californiad3 had
such a flavor:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of
the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in
its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the
arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They
believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and.., that the greatest
menace to freedom is an inert people .... But they knew that order
cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its
infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagina-
tion .... 84
Professor Alexander Meiklejohn also assumed that an Aristotelian
populace attended his famous metaphorical town meeting, 5 though
he did not acknowledge them as such. The "success of self-govern-
ment," Meiklejohn suggested, depends on "cultivating the general
intelligence."8 6 He argued that the "freedom of mind" that "befits
members of a self-governing society" could be established "by
learning, by teaching, by the unhindered flow of accurate informa-
tion, by giving men health and vigor and security, by bringing them
together in activities of communication and mutual understand-
ing."87 Meiklejohn even appears to say that the individual's capacity
to deliberate, a core value in an aristotelian First Amendment, is all-
important: "the attempt to know and to understand has a unique
status, a unique authority, to which all other activities are subordinat-
ed.,,18
83. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
84. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
85. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 22-25
(1948).
86. Id. at 17.
87. Id. at 16-17.
88. Id. at 69. This description sounds very much like Nussbaum's descriptions of
government actions necessary to encourage Aristotelian development. According to Nussbaum,
Aristotle saw the purpose of political institutions as making "available to each and every citizen
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In one sense, then, an aristotelian theory of the First Amendment
would do for self-definition what Meiklejohn89 and other political
speech theorists' think the First Amendment does for political self-
determination. Under a political theory, the First Amendment
establishes a system of expression that protects and facilitates the
process of political deliberation and debate,91 the assumption being
that society will advance as it deliberates. In contrast, an aristotelian
First Amendment would establish a system of expression that protects
and facilitates the process of individual self-definition by encouraging
critical reflection, allowing exposure to the ideas of others, and
nurturing the development of individual forms of expression. The
aristotelian theory assumes that each individual advances toward self-
capacity and develops self-identity as she is challenged to be delibera-
tive, unique, and self-aware. Personal autonomy is not a means to an
end, or an "instrument of collective self-determination."92 Autono-
my, real autonomy, is the end.
An aristotelian theory of free expression might result in many of
the same outcomes as either the political or autonomy-based theories.
For example, an aristotelian First Amendment, like a political model
of free speech, would value the richness of political deliberation. An
Aristotelian, however, would value such expression not for its value to
the political process alone, but also because of its usefulness to
individuals' intellectual, political, and social self-definition. In
the material, institutional, and educational circumstances in which good human functioning may
be chosen." Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 203. Like Meiklejohn, the Aristotelian recognizes the
centrality of education to a successful political design. See id. at 233 ("[No] part of the political
design occupies the Aristotelian as much as education."); NUSSRAUM, supra note 51, at 102
(discussing desirability of providing "universal access to higher education" to promote democra-
cy); cf. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 85, at 102-03 (stating that protection of public discourse is crucial
to formation of well-informed and well-educated populace that is capable of effective self-
governance).
89. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 85, at 25 (stating that success of system of self-governance is
contingent on ability of individual citizens to acquire knowledge and understanding).
90. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 243 (recognizing utility of public discussion and
deliberation and significant contribution of free expression to improved public decisionmaking);
SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONST1rrTION, supra note 51, at 199-203, 257-70 (contending that
primary objective of First Amendment "is to protect democratic politics from government"); Fiss,
supra note 80, at 1407 (stating that democracy and its assurance of "collective self-determination"
is premised on opportunity to engage in vigorous and uninhibited public debate).
91. See Fiss, supra note 80, at 1407 (positing that free speech is "one of the essential
preconditions of an effective democracy"). The distinction between protecting political speech
itself and protecting a system of public debate is not always clear and requires careful thought.
Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 37 (suggesting that constitutional validity of legal rules should be
assessed in terms of whether rules "promote greater attention to public issues"); id. at 130
(defining "political speech," and proposing that it is "high value"); Fiss, supra note 80, at 1419
(recognizing that in political model of First Amendment, political speech will often be on both
sides of equation and therefore might need to be regulated in some cases to further system that
maximizes public debate).
92. Fiss, supra note 80, at 1410.
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addition, because a respect for individual choice is crucial to the
process of self-definition,93 an aristotelian theory would often align
with the absolutist theory and defer to private ordering of speech in
the absence of strong reasons to question the integrity of citizens'
preference formation.
On the other hand, an aristotelian First Amendment would result
in different outcomes than either theory in several ways. It would
likely result in more protection of nonpolitical speech (including
literature, music, art, and film) than would a political theory.94 At
its core it would preserve expression that is important to individuals
in their struggle to become more free, even if portions of that
freedom were only imperfectly related to politics. Sexually explicit
materials that had nothing to do with politics, but were conducive to
sexual development and identity, for example, might arguably be
central to an aristotelian First Amendment.
In contrast with the absolutist position, an aristotelian stance could
acknowledge that not all expression is equally efficacious in develop-
ing self-capacity," that some speech crowds out other speech, that
some expression undercuts rather than builds capacity, and that the
rights of the speaker sometimes encroach on the rights of the
listener.96 These admissions would not create dilemmas within an
aristotelian First Amendment framework as it might in an absolutist
scheme. Indeed, in an aristotelian system of free expression, it would
be extremely surprising if the rule were simply "the more speech the
better." As in a political theory that would regulate some speech
rights in the interest of overall societal deliberation,97 the aristotelian
theory would allow some regulation of individual preferences when
93. Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 238-39 (discussing importance of choice in Aristotelian
social democracy and ways in which citizens can exercise freedom to choose).
94. In fact, an aristotelian First Amendment might be more protective than even a "strong"
conception of political speech, which seeks to ensure that the citizenry can develop the requisite
intellectual abilities necessary for self-government. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. Cr. REv. 245, 255-57 ("Self-government can exist only insofar
as the voters acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general
welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express.").
95. Consider, for example, Redish's claim that "in some sense all communicative activity
fosters the same ultimate intellectual values embodied in the first amendment." REDISH, supra
note 73, at 264 (footnote omitted).
96. See David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
334, 368-71 (1991) (exploring importance of listener in First Amendment theory).
97. See Fiss, supra note 80, at 1419-20 (observing that improvement of public discourse
sometimes requires regulation of certain types of expression). Even an occasional absolutist will
allow for such a possibility. See Emerson, supra note 74, at 948 (admitting that in some cases,
speech restrictions designed to "purify the democratic process" may "by limiting the freedom
of some, expand the freedom of a greater number.").
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necessary to develop a society more conducive to individuals'
development of aristotelian capabilities.98
Additionally, while the absolutist First Amendment suggests that the
government is the enemy of free speech and that citizens should be
free of its control, 9 an aristotelian First Amendment would suggest
that risks to true autonomy come from societal, as well as governmen-
tal, pressures. True autonomy is endangered not only by government
meddling, but also by the intellectual and emotional automatism that
results when individuals do not have the opportunity to self-define
separately from the status quo. To the extent that this status quo is
a product of legal structures, the "freedom of speech" would be
legitimately concerned with protecting the individual's right to define
herself independently of it."°  Indeed, an Aristotelian's nightmare
is a nation in which most of its citizens believe that they live in a free
society while, in truth, few of them have the capacity or opportunity
to self-define separately from conventional morality and norms. Such
a nation would be analogous to a society of two-dimensional creatures
unable to imagine a third dimension, and who find themselves
shocked and offended by those who tell them that expansion along
a third axis would make life more fulfilling and robust.
The aristotelian First Amendment, therefore, would be less
confident about the common (pre-New Deal) distinctions in First
Amendment law between government inaction and action, or between
positive and negative rights.10 1 It might be that the primary ques-
tion for the purposes of First Amendment analysis would be whether
the legal structure created by the government imposed constraints on
protected expression, that is, expression conducive to individual self-
definition and capacity-building. Here, also, a supporter of an
aristotelian First Amendment would agree with political speech
theorists in being less reluctant to accept positive government action,
98. This point is analogous to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Red Lion Broadcasting v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), where the Court upheld the "fairness doctrine," which required
broadcasters to attend to public issues and allow equal time for opposing viewpoints. Id. at 375.
The Court held that the fairness doctrine "would enhance rather than abridge the freedoms of
speech and press," id., because "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters which is paramount." Id. at 390.
99. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 5.
100. This is similar to the political theorists' argument that First Amendment scrutiny should
apply when legal structures give private entities the power to restrict political speech. See; e.g.,
SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 43-46 ("The real issues are that public authority creates legal
structures that restrict speech, that new exercises of public authority can counter the existing
restrictions, and that any restrictions, even those of the common law, should be assessed under
constitutional principles because they are restrictions.").
101. See Fiss, supra note 80, at 1413-14 (discussing traditional view, which equates "liberty with
limited government").
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within certain constraints.1 2  Just as the police are required to
control an angry mob trying to impose a heckler's veto on a contro-
versial speaker, an aristotelian First Amendment might require the
government to act when necessary to guarantee and safeguard the
conditions essential to fulfill the goals of the First Amendment.103
Of course, an aristotelian First Amendment doctrine, as all other
theories, will face tough intermediate cases. Without a deeper
description of the doctrine and a thorough analysis of its implications,
the actual impact of such a theory on First Amendment practice is
difficult to evaluate. Even with such a description and analysis, the
theory's edges might be blurry, raising institutional concerns about
judicial competency, predictability of results, and appropriateness of
remedies.
104
Nevertheless, as a preliminary matter, one can identify two salient
tensions within the theory. I mention these as problems to be solved;
while I suggest some tentative responses, these are indeed tentative-I
will not pretend to propose solutions here.
First, if the First Amendment provides some of the institutional
prerequisites necessary to give citizens the capacity to choose to
function well, allowances must be made for those who choose not to
so function.0 5 One risk in Aristotelianism generally is to misinter-
pret a choice not to flourish as an inability to flourish. In the First
Amendment context, one could imagine citizens choosing to watch,
read, or listen to expression that constrained or harmed them in
certain ways-violent child pornography, or day-long reruns of Wheel
of Fortune, for example. There may at times be conflict, both real and
apparent, between, on the one hand, a respect for choice-central to
102. SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 47-48 (discussing instances in which positive government
regulation is appropriate to facilitate free expression); Fiss, supra note 80, at 1415-16 ("Just as
it is no longer possible to assume that the private sector is all freedom, we can no longer assume
that the state is all censorship.").
103. This recognition that the government must sometimes act to ensure the preconditions
for free expression is not new. For an explanation from a revered "absolutist" source, see
Emerson, supra note 74, at 902-04, 946-54.
104. Here, again, I would agree with Owen Fiss, who states:
The problem of remedies and the limits on institutional competence may, in the last
instance cause theJustices... to retreat from such an ambitious undertaking, but such
a failure of nerve, or exercise in prudence, should be recognized for what it is: a
compromise, and not a vindication of the first amendment and its deepest democratic
aspirations.
Fiss, supra note 80, at 1424.
105. See Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 234-40 (discussing importance to pluralistic society that
government permit citizens to make choices based on welfare and virtue and refrain from
imposing favored value system on citizens).
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Aristotelianism °6 as well as liberalism,1 17 and on the other hand,
the constitutional interest in building the capacity for choice, a
primary goal in an aristotelian First Amendment. 8 To be sure, this
tension may easily be overstated."° But the difficulty that does exist
is magnified by the fact that because preferences adapt to poor
situations, and the capacity to choose requires certain conditions that
may or may not exist, what might seem to be a poor choice is
sometimes the inability to choose in disguise." 0 This tension is
quite difficult to assess in the abstract. As a preliminary matter, it is
evident that the institutional preconditions for building capacity are
still quite incomplete in our society. Thus, much work might be done
to make aristotelian autonomy more possible for most citizens before
this tension with respect for choice becomes a real obstacle. In other
words, there is so much work to be done, that some can be done
before we need to draw the toughest distinctions.
The second tension within the theory will inevitably arise when
certain First Amendment activities promote some individuals' self-
development but harm or limit others'. This is the tension that goes
unrecognized in most absolutist constructions,"' but which an
aristotelian theory would have to consider and resolve."'
One might tentatively suggest three responses. First, an aristotelian
First Amendment would be concerned with the construction of a
system of expression that promoted individual capacity-building.
Structural or institutional concerns probably would require some
regulation of individual expression in some cases. This is no different
from any other free speech theory, however. Even in an absolutist's
106. See Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 238-40 (illustrating importance of choice in Aristotelian
democracy by providing examples of Aristotelian citizens' decisionmaking processes).
107. See GALSTON, supra note 51, at 183-88 (identifying "choice" as one of "three basic liberal
claims"); see also Nussbaum, supra note 50, at 1027 (discussing "fundamental respect for choice"
indicative of both liberal and Aristotelian theories).
108. See Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 228 (pointing to Aristotelian goal of creating system for
facilitating informed choice over citizen's entire life).
109. Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 238-40.
110. See Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 238 (explaining difference between passive choice, or
decision to remain silent, and lack of ability or opportunity to choose). This, by the way, must
be what MacKinnon believes is occurring when women "enjoy" watching or participating in
subordinating pornography: society has put them in a position where they are unable to choose
wisely. MACKINNON, supra note 42, at 5-6.
111. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 73, at 233, 236,242 (noting that although autonomy principle
might permit regulation of acts that hurt others, it would not allow regulation of expression on
that basis because right of speaker always prevails).
112. An analogous tension arises in the political model of the First Amendment. Ifpolitical
speech is at the core of First Amendment protection, there will be instances when the political
speech of some will crowd out or harm the ability of others to engage in political debate. See
Fiss, supra note 80, at 1419 (analyzing tension that results when expression of political opinion
squelches other points of view).
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world, the right of a newspaper to decide whether to publish an op-ed
piece limits the writer's ability to express her views in the way she
prefers.'13 The absolutist theory requires that the newspaper's
desire not to speak trumps the writer's desire to speak. This result
may or may not be correct,"' but the fact that someone's speech
has been "sacrificed" by the theory is evident. An aristotelian First
Amendment would face similar balancing acts.
A second response would be to note that an individual's aristotelian
capacity, i.e., autonomy, includes within it a concern for the flourish-
ing of others. According to Martha Nussbaum, Aristotle was prepared
to say that a human being who does not regard his or her life as, in
a fundamental way, a life lived with and toward others, would not be
regarded as good or capable. 15 Humans are not solitary beings; we
are made more capable when we are able to affiliate with others who
are definite individuals, each a "separate chooser of a life plan." 6
In this view, in a situation in which one person's expression harmed
another in a way cognizable by an aristotelian theory, the harm would
be suffered by all those who live with and around the person harmed.
In considering the proper reading of the First Amendment, therefore,
it would be plausible to argue that the harms should be counted more
than once because they would be suffered by more than one
individual." 7
A third response might focus on the fact that within an aristotelian
theory, some human capacities might be considered "architectonic"
in that they organize and arrange all the others."8 Nussbaum
113. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding that
Florida's "right of reply" statute, which granted politicians equal space to respond to newspaper
editorials, violated First Amendment). But see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
375 (1969) (holding that FCC application of "fairness doctrine" that required broadcasters to
grant targets of personal and political attacks "equal time" to respond did not offend First
Amendment).
114. SeeJerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641 (1967) (arguing that First Amendment should guarantee dissidents right of access to
newspapers); Fried, supra note 73, at 227-28 (arguing that requiring newspapers to print diverse
points of view is "but a short step to suppression pure and simple"); cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 3,
at 108 (discussing disparate treatment of print media, which have been subject to only limited
government regulation, and broadcasting industry, which is susceptible to broad range of
government oversight).
115. Nussbaum, supra note 50, at 1023 (citing ARISTOTLE, PoLmCS 1.1253a2-18 (E. Barker
trans., 1962)).
116. Nussbaum, supra note 50, at 1023-24.
117. Whether the benefits should also be counted more than once is a complex question.
One might suggest that the answer would depend on whether the expression in question is
capacity-building speech or speech that is "neutral" in Aristotelian terms. Existing free speech
doctrine, in contrast, already double-counts benefits, in that it is assumed that society or truth
advances when someone speaks. Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 255, 259
(1992). The harms are often not counted at all.
118. Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 226.
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identifies "practical reason," the capacity to plan and organize one's
life, and "affiliation," the capacity to recognize and empathize with
other beings, as architectonic." 9 In tough First Amendment cases,
therefore, one might plausibly concern herself first and foremost with
the architectonic functionings. In addition, the concern of an
aristotelian First Amendment is related to a threshold: the task of
aristotelian politics and an aristotelian First Amendment is to ensure
the institutional prerequisites whereby all citizens can cross "a
threshold into a condition in which good human functioning, at least
a minimal level, can be chosen."12 ° One might suggest, therefore,
that in the First Amendment calculus the interests of those who have
already crossed the threshold simply cannot trump the interests of
those who have not. At least in the sense of getting as many as
possible to cross the threshold of good human functioning, "capability




How, then, can an aristotelian theory help in the debate about
sexually explicit speech, erotica, and pornography? More than any
other theory, an aristotelian First Amendment would better allow us
to balance the harms and benefits of sexually explicit speech.
Existing doctrine undervalues sexual expression in significant ways, yet
it cannot recognize the harms that flow from it 12 2 In a political
model, sexually explicit speech lies far from the core of protection
unless it has political overtones, an imperfect indicator of either lack
of harm or existence of value.
In contrast, an aristotelian First Amendment sees sexuality as an
important part of humanity and therefore considers sexually explicit
speech to be, plausibly, at the very heart of First Amendment
protection. But, importantly, the Aristotelian does not stop there:
the harms discussed by MacKinnon, when they exist, are in an
important sense First Amendment harms. More work needs to be
done here, but it seems reasonable to believe that certain types of
pornography make it more difficult to be "finely aware and richly
119. Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 222, 226.
120. Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 228.
121. See Nussbaum, supra note 50, at 1028 (discussing tension between objective of capability
equality and forces that "prevent equality from being realized").
122. Cf American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328-29 (7th Cir. 1985)
(accepting harm arising from pornography but finding that First Amendment does not allow
regulation on that basis, as harm "simply demonstrates the power of pornography as speech"),
aft'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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responsible." 123  If, as MacKinnon suggests, men who watch violent
pornography are influenced subconsciously in a way that is not easily
counterbalanced by counterspeech or "practical reason" (pp. 16-17),
or if women are prevented from flourishing by the pervasiveness of
images that shame and denigrate them on the basis of their sex (p.
7),124 these harms would be cognizable within the First Amendment.
These harms are not, as First Amendment tradition would see them,
harms that come from without-that is, harms that can be balanced
against the value of the words only if the words are first considered
"low value." Within an aristotelian First Amendment theory, these
harms, cognizable as First Amendment harms, could be considered
even when "core speech" is in the balance." In other words, the
harms that MacKinnon posits must be taken into account in an
aristotelian First Amendment doctrine because they are qualitatively
equal to the benefits that flow from the expression.
26
Asking constitutional decisionmakers to balance competing
considerations in this context is hardly unproblematic. Such a tactic
begs comparison with one of the most famous, and one of the most
ridiculed,judicial pronouncements about obscenity-Justice Stewart's
statement that he could not pretend to define "hard-core pornogra-
phy" but that "[he] know[s] it when [he] see[s] it."127 To be sure,
asking judges to balance the harms and benefits of certain kinds of
speech does not mean that the law has thrown up its hands in
frustration as Justice Stewart seemed to do.2 8  In fact, in evaluating
judicial decisionmaking (and rationality in general) there is much to
123. See supra text accompanying note 24 (noting effect of pornography on men).
124. See BARTKY, supra note 26, at 22-32, 83-98.
125. This is similar to Fiss's point that if the First Amendment contemplates political speech
at its core, the tough issues become how to balance free speech values against one another,
rather than how to weigh individual free will-traditionally the First Amendment value-against
the robustness and balance of public debate (traditionally considered to be something other
than free speech values). See Fiss, supra note 80, at 1423-25. Fiss quotes the Supreme Court in
describing the traditional view: "'[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign
to the First Amendment.... .'" First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-91 (1978) (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976)). A supporter of an aristotelian First Amendment
would disagree, as does Fiss.
126. Cf Fiss, supra note 80, at 1420-21 (discussing role ofjudiciary in balancing benefits and
evils of certain types of expression, and suggesting that courts should limit such expression only
if intervention "enriches rather than impoverishes public debate").
127. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
128. Even some supporters of a more absolute First Amendment recognize that "belief in
some degree of case-by-case judicial flexibility does not imply acceptance of completely
unguided, virtually emotive and unprincipled judicial decision-making." REDISH, supra note 73,
at 261.
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be said for an awareness of the particularities of each situation.'2
It is certainly plausible that an aristotelian First Amendment, by
relieving the law of "its iron-fisted denial of complexity and ambigu-
ity,"' 3° would improve our reasoning about tough issues like pornog-
raphy.
At the very least, by allowing some type of balancing, the First
Amendment would no longer require judges to disregard harms that
flowed from speech as long as someone, anyone, prefers to speak.1
31
Courts would no longer have to depend solely on intellectually uneasy
distinctions of what is and is not "speech," whether a regulation is
content or viewpoint "neutral," or whether something is "patently
offensive." Instead, it seems to me, the First Amendment would
require a commitment on the part of constitutional decisionmakers
to do all they possibly could to support and encourage efforts to
enrich the lives of the public, to make citizens more free in an
Aristotelian sense. This would require them to ask questions about
what freedom is and what constitutes meaningful choice. These
inquiries will be difficult, especially at first. But at least these
questions would help guide us to wise decisions, rather than obfuscate
the inquiry with false issues and distracting considerations.
129. NUSSBAUM, supra note 51, at 66-75 (emphasizing importance of not being constrained
by previously derived general rules and principles to extent that limits ability to adequately
address particularized situation).
130. Mary Gaitskill, On Not Being A Victima, HARPER'S, Mar. 1994, at 35, 38.
131. See Fried, supra note 73, at 242 ("If the audience is the object of the insult, the speaker's
interest in expression still supplies half of the privilege, which is enough to prevail.").
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